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Summary 
This report assesses California’s special education finance policy and suggests 
improvements, about a decade after California overhauled special education financing to 
address concerns about the efficacy of the previous system. That overhaul, Assembly Bill 602 
(1997), sought to ensure greater funding equity, eliminate inappropriate placement incentives, 
and streamline the funding model, among other objectives. We find that finance reform has led 
to positive changes but that the state can do more to implement its desired reform goals. 
Special education programs help in educating California’s children with disabilities, 
who represent one in ten public school students statewide. Program expenditures amounted to 
$9.3 billion in 2006–07, or more than 16 percent of K–12 general fund spending (Lipscomb, 
2009b). Special education differs from most educational programs because children with 
disabilities in the United States are legally entitled to free, appropriate services based on their 
individual needs. This service entitlement, along with the magnitude of expenditures and 
earlier finance reform, makes special education an important part of California’s education 
finance policy. 
Special education aid from federal, state, and local sources, at $4.7 billion in 2006–07, is 
California’s largest pool of funding specifically for one education program. California allocates 
most of this funding on a per-student basis, regardless of disability status; the underlying 
assumption is that disabilities vary evenly across the population. Since enacting this funding 
model, California has reduced but not eliminated historical inequities in the per-student 
funding rate across the state. Inequities in funding rates reflect historical circumstances and are 
not consistent with the type of special education finance system that California chose to adopt 
in 1997.  
By design, California’s special education finance model does not reimburse school 
districts for expenditures related to greater reported special education needs. This policy 
encourages districts to serve students cost-effectively, but it also means that the local share of 
spending on special education mandates can differ substantially across the state. This report 
suggests that California consider funding rate equalization, with adjustments based on factors 
outside of district control—factors that arguably describe true cost variation. Such adjustments 
could partly account for differences in costs but without giving districts an incentive to over-
represent special education needs.  
Precedent for this kind of funding adjustment comes from the federal government, 
which allocates part of its special education funding based on poverty. Within California, severe 
disability rates tend to be higher among children from lower-income families. California could 
adapt the federal model, and could add other factors too, such as varying labor market 
conditions. Per-pupil spending, which is primarily for salaries, is sensitive to regional variation 
in labor market conditions for non-teachers with similar qualifications, even holding disability 
rates constant. These potential adjustment factors would describe different types of costs to 
meet special education mandates, with the first arguably related to incidence and the second 
related to the expected price of employee compensation.  
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Following this assessment, this report then simulates how California could use the 
principles of the current system to allocate funds at an equal rate per student, adjusted by these 
two factors. The simulation adjusts for low-income students and regional labor market 
conditions, but California could substitute other factors, such as an updated version of the 
formula’s existing cost proxy. These refinements would redistribute how the state allocates 
existing funds, but would also lead to fuller implementation of current funding objectives.   
 
 
 
All technical appendices to this paper are available on the PPIC website: 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/other/809SLR_appendix.pdf 
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Introduction 
Special education is a mandated but under-evaluated part of state commitments to 
public education. Under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 
children with disabilities have a legal entitlement to a “free and appropriate public education.”1
The service entitlement alone makes special education finance an important policy issue 
for California and other states. But special education is also a multibillion-dollar program that 
serves more than 10 percent of California’s public school enrollment. In fact, the $4.7 billion in 
federal, state, and local special education aid that California school districts received in 2006–07 
was their largest source of funding specifically for one program. Nevertheless, a growing 
concern in California is that expenses related to meeting special education mandates tend to 
“encroach” on other education funds.
 
This service entitlement makes special education different from most educational programs 
because it supersedes the availability of funding. In effect, school districts must meet their 
mandate to serve disabled children before supporting other budgeted programs.   
2
The state legislature overhauled the special education system in 1997. Policymakers 
cited several undesirable properties of the prior system, such as funding inequity, complexity, 
and inappropriate placement incentives as reasons for pursuing reform. The reform bill, AB 602, 
enacted a new allocation model that addressed these issues by assuming that disabilities vary 
evenly across the state. The current formula distributes the predominant share of special 
education funds based on total student population size rather than the size of disabled 
populations or the needs of disabled students. The requirement that school districts meet all 
special education needs appropriately, whether needs are rare or frequent, inexpensive or 
costly, still applies. The perception of budgetary tension between special education and other 
programs is especially clear in California, where school districts have few options for raising 
additional revenue to meet new special education demands. 
 In recent years, special education spending has grown 
faster than spending on other programs while special education funding has grown more 
slowly than general-purpose funds. Spending on special education services in California totaled 
$9.3 billion in 2006–07, over 16 percent of all K–12 spending (Lipscomb, 2009b).  
This report examines special education financing in California in 2006–07, about a 
decade after AB 602 passed. It explores the funding process, patterns of disability, and patterns 
of spending on disabled children. It serves as the basis for evaluating California’s finance policy 
today and considers whether the state should pursue further refinements. The first section, on 
funding, examines the extent to which switching to a per-student funding system has led to 
greater funding equity. The following section, on disability rates, describes disability patterns 
with respect to income and factors like demography because special education needs may vary 
across the state despite the assumption that they do not. Lastly, we document expenditures, 
including the local share, and describe spending patterns among regions of California where 
personnel costs are arguably higher.  
                                                     
1 IDEA first passed in 1975 as the Education of all Handicapped Children Act. Congress last reauthorized it in 2004.  
2 Regular education budgets funded 28 percent of special education spending in California in 2004 (Asimov, 2006). Harr, Parrish, 
and Chambers (2008) refer to encroachment as a growing policy concern in reviewing special education research. 
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We view special education financing and spending through the lens of IDEA 
requirements that special education aid help defray a school district’s additional spending on 
children with disabilities—above its average spending on all children. Concerns about 
encroachment—the shortfall between additional spending on disabled children and special 
education aid—suggest that special education is raiding funding for other programs, although 
practically every state funds special education through a combination of federal, state, and local 
revenue. As Harr, Parrish, and Chambers (2008) explain, what is considered encroachment in 
one state may be considered the local share in another. This report adopts a similar view and 
whenever possible refers to encroachment as local support for additional spending on children 
with disabilities. 
 This list summarizes key terminology used in the report:  
• Spending on children with disabilities—Combined special education and non-
special education spending to educate children with disabilities  
• Additional spending on children with disabilities—Spending on children with 
disabilities above the average for all children 
• Special education funds—Federal, state, and local revenue reserved for educating 
children with disabilities 
• Local support for additional spending on children with disabilities—Additional 
spending that is not covered by special education funds (i.e., encroachment) 
The report concludes that AB 602 improved special education finance from the previous 
system, but that California can take additional steps to implement the desired changes that 
reform intended to achieve, like greater funding equity. The conclusion suggests improvements, 
such as refinements to the allocation model itself, and describes how those might work. 
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Financing Special Education in California 
The Funding Process 
Special education in California received $4.7 billion in funding from federal, state, and 
local sources in 2006–07.3 The California Department of Education (CDE) allocates these funds to 
120 regional groups of school districts known as Special Education Local Plan Areas (SELPAs) 
that coordinate special education activities to offer a wider range of services more efficiently.4
Under AB 602 (1997), California has distributed most special education funds based on 
the average daily attendance (ADA) of each SELPA’s entire student population since 1998–99. 
Disability counts and special education expenditures are not part of the funding equation.
 
CDE effectively controls the total size of special education grants from all sources because it 
deducts federal and local funding from state aid when determining SELPA allocations. 
5 
California’s funding process is a census-based, or capitation, model. While not the predominant 
choice across the states, the use of census-based models has grown since 1991, and the federal 
government and nine other states now use them.6
AB 602 addressed several key concerns with the finance model that had been in place. 
The old system, which allocated funds based on the number of classes in different instructional 
settings that districts reported, was widely seen as inequitable and overly complex; districts 
received different amounts of money for serving children in equivalent settings, even in the 
same SELPA. Transitioning to a formula based on a flat grant per student increased funding 
equity and transparency. Streamlining the allocation formula also helped the legislature to 
increase district flexibility in using funds. In addition, state policymakers wanted to avoid 
incentivizing inappropriate special education placements, which can happen when school 
districts receive funding based on their self-reported needs. Under a census-based model, 
school districts that classify more children as disabled incur additional costs but receive no 
additional funding. The pure fiscal incentive actually is to identify fewer disabilities and 
provide less costly services.  
 Most states continue to use more 
conventional formulas based on the population and reported needs of disabled students. 
The sensitivity of identification rates to funding incentives is well documented by 
researchers, whose findings suggest that census-based models are associated with lower 
disability rates.7
                                                     
3 Lipscomb (2009b) describes the components of California’s special education funding process. 
 For example, Dhuey and Lipscomb (2009) estimate a relationship between 
states adopting census-based models and an 8–10 percent average reduction in their disability 
rate, mostly in the categories of learning disabilities and mental retardation; no category 
experienced a statistically significant increase in identification. Adopting these models was also 
associated with greater use of outside school placements for severely disabled children. These 
4 SELPA membership in 2006-07 ranged from a single district to 47 districts. Tulare is the SELPA with the most member districts. 
There were 36 single district SELPAs. California has over 1,000 school districts and county offices of education. 
5 The exception is a small number of extraordinarily high cost placements. 
6 The states are Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. 
Missouri, South Dakota, and Vermont use a partial census model.   
7 For example, see Dhuey and Lipscomb (2009), Greene and Forster (2002), Kwak (2008), Lipscomb (2009a), and Mahitivanichcha 
and Parrish (2005). Cullen (2003) does not examine a census-based model but reaches similar conclusions about funding incentives 
in special education. 
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are the most expensive placements, but the increase may be because all census-based formulas 
provide some reimbursement for extraordinarily high-cost placements. Some evidence suggests 
a link between census-based reform and a higher rate of requests for dispute resolution in 
special education matters (Lipscomb 2009a).8
The general findings from the research literature support conclusions about capitation 
payments in health care applications.
 Designing educational programs for disabled 
children may become slightly more contentious between parents and schools when states stop 
providing funds based on reported needs.  
9
Funding Levels 
 Managed care systems typically reimburse providers 
based on the number of patients they see per month, rather than patient severity or the cost of 
treatment. The systems are cost-containment strategies, but introduce a direct incentive for 
providers to seek healthier patients and provide fewer services. Census-based policies in special 
education are similar because funding helps school districts meet individual needs but need 
plays little role in determining funding.   
In transitioning to a census-based model, California began equalizing the funding 
amount that students (regardless of disability status) generate for their SELPA. This amount, 
called the base rate, underpins most special education allocations in California. Figure 1 shows 
that California has reduced but not eliminated the disparities that existed in 1998. In fact, the 
SELPAs that had high base rates in 1998 continue to have high base rates today. The statewide 
average base rate has remained mostly constant over the last five years in 2006 dollars.  
Figure 1 
SELPA Base Rates in 2006 Dollars 
 
NOTE: High and low base rates correspond to the 95th and the 5th percentile rates in California. The 5th 
percentile is higher than the rate that applies to 5 percent of California students. Data come from CDE.   
 
Base rate differences translate into differences in funding per student. The first chart in 
Figure 2 compares SELPA base rates in 2006–07 with AB 602 funds, which represent 89 percent 
                                                     
8 The evidence comes from an “enrollment weighted” specification, suggesting nationwide growth in the rate of dispute resolution 
requests per special education student. Dhuey and Lipscomb (2009) treat states equally regardless of size. They find a statistically 
insignificant average response across reform states. 
9 Newhouse (1996) reviews this literature.  
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of federal, state, and local special education revenue.10 There is a visible upward relationship. 
The relationship is not perfect because the allocation formula has several adjustment factors, 
such as for regionalized services in small SELPAs (less than 15,000 ADA) and for SELPAs 
eligible for a Special Disabilities Adjustment (SDA). (SDA funds are for SELPAs that the 
legislature found to have a greater incidence of high cost disabilities in 1998 but relatively lower 
base rates. The SDA is the only cost proxy in place. The next chapter discusses the SDA in 
further detail.) 
Figure 2 
Relationships Between Base Rates and Special Education Funds, 2006–07 
 
 
 
SOURCE: AB 602 Funding Exhibits   
 
The second chart in Figure 2 removes these adjustment factors. The remaining funds still 
represent 81 percent of federal, state, and local special education revenue. The link between 
base rates and funding becomes nearly one to one, suggesting that historical inequities explain 
much of the difference in funding across SELPAs today. Further descriptive analysis in the 
Appendix corroborates this conclusion. The analysis adjusts the overall amount of special 
                                                     
10 AB 602 does not allocate funds for several types of services, the largest of which are for special education transportation and 
infants with disabilities. 
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education funds per student for differences in the base rate, whether SELPAs serve fewer than 
15,000 students, and whether they are eligible for SDA funding. These three factors alone 
explain nearly 80 percent of the variation in funding, primarily because of the association 
between base rates and funding per student.11
The lack of full base rate equalization has little justification more than a decade 
following AB 602’s enactment because funding equity is one of the main rationales for adopting 
a census-based model. Figure 2 indicates that factors like the SDA help somewhat by providing 
more revenue to some SELPAs with lower base rates. But California could further AB 602’s 
goals of equity and transparency by starting with a level playing field for everyone.  
 
The state could then consider funding adjustments based on factors outside of SELPA 
control that are good proxies for true cost variation. A criticism of pure census models is that 
they do not account for variation in student need (Parrish, et al., 2003). The problem is that 
identifying good proxies is difficult. Many of the adjustment factors we think of first, like 
disability rates and spending, are to some extent within a district’s control. Adjusting funding 
based on these measures reintroduces the same inappropriate incentives issue census-based 
models were supposed to avoid. 
When faced with this same problem in allocating IDEA funds, the federal government 
decided to adjust apportionments for child poverty rates. In general, health outcomes tend to 
improve with socioeconomic status, so the poverty adjustment arguably helps account for part 
of the variation in special education need. The federal formula distributes 85 percent of funds 
based on population and 15 percent based on poverty. This report examines patterns of 
disability and spending in California to identify potential factors that could arguably serve as 
proxies for true cost variation. It then illustrates how California could incorporate these factors 
into an allocation formula.  
 
                                                     
11 Appendix Table A.1 provides summary statistics for the variables. Table A.2 contains the results. 
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Disability Rates and Income 
All census models assume that disabilities are spread evenly across the population. 
California justified AB 602’s goal of equalizing funding per student based on the premise that 
“handicapping conditions of similar severity” occur with “roughly equal frequency.”12 AB 602 
directs special education funds to SELPAs in part to allay fears that the equal frequency 
assumption may not hold for smaller populations like school districts.13
A 1998 report by the American Institutes for Research (AIR) concluded that severe/high 
cost disabilities did vary across SELPAs more than could be expected randomly.
  
14 Based on 
that, the legislature added the SDA program to the allocation formula as a cost proxy. The SDA 
provides a severity supplement to some lower-funded SELPAs based on the services that their 
high cost special education students received in 1997. In 2006–07, SDA funds provided $81 
million to 34 SELPAs or about $34 per student in eligible SELPAs. The legislature has never 
updated the incidence multipliers used to determine eligibility.15
Although the SDA derives from historical data, it identifies SELPAs with current higher 
rates of severe disabilities. Table 1 indicates that in 2006–07, the rate of severe disabilities was 15 
percent higher in SDA-eligible SELPAs. This study defines disability severity at the category of 
disability level, following the delineation that California uses in its financial data.
 
16 Severity 
clearly varies within categories too, meaning that the delineation is imperfect. Yet the categories 
in the severe group tend to be more costly to service, suggesting that grouping disabilities by 
category is reasonable across the population.17
Table 1 
Severe Disability Rates and Income by SDA Funding Status, 2006–07 
  
 Severe Disabilities 
(% of Students) 
Free or Reduced-price Meals 
(% of Students) 
SELPAs Receiving SDA Funding 2.59 57.64 
SELPAs Not Receiving SDA Funding 2.27 46.40 
NOTE: Sample based on 119 SELPAs. The proportions in each column are statistically different at the 5 
percent level. The z-statistics are 26 and 274, respectively.  
 
The AIR (1998) study recommended a cost adjustment based on services received by 
high-cost students partly because a measure like poverty did not reliably explain the observed 
differences in severity across California a decade ago. This study finds some evidence in recent 
                                                     
12 AB 602 Bill Analysis (1997) 
13 This was a recommendation from a 1995 report published by the Legislative Analyst’s Office, the Department of Education, and 
the Department of Finance. 
14 Parrish, Kaleba, Gerber, and McLaughlin (1998)  
15 The SDA incidence multipliers also help determine cost-of-living adjustments and growth funding. 
16 Based on the California School Accounting Manual’s (2008), severe disabilities include autism, deafness, deaf-blindness, 
emotional disturbance, mental retardation, multiple disabilities, orthopedic impairments, traumatic brain injury, and visual 
impairments (including blindness). Non-severe disabilities are learning disabilities, speech or language impairments, and other 
health impairments.  
17 Parrish, Harr, Kidron, Brock, Anand (2004) estimate disability costs for California in 2002–03. 
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data of a negative relationship between disability status and income. SDA eligibility also 
appears to correlate with income. For instance, Table 1 indicates that SELPAs receiving SDA 
funds have a higher rate of participation in free or reduced-price meals, a program with an 
income eligibility cap at 185 percent of the federal poverty level.  
Findings from the California Health Interview Survey 
Figure 3 uses the California Health Interview Survey (CHIS), the largest state-
representative health survey in the United States, to show that severe conditions tend to be less 
common among children from higher income families. CHIS surveyed parents about their 
children’s disabilities, and the sample includes 6,515 children ages 5 to 11 in 2005. The findings 
from the analysis are representative of California children in that age range. 
Figure 3 
Income and Child Disability Conditions, 
California Health Interview Survey, 2005 
 
NOTE: Each income category contains 20 percent of the sample. Table A.3 provides summary statistics on 
the CHIS variables. Adjusted disability rates come from regression estimates in Appendix Table A.4.  
 
The horizontal axis divides the sample into five equally sized groups based on income. 
The first and third columns on the horizontal axis show the average rate of severe and non-
severe conditions in each group. Both show a negative relationship with income, although the 
relationship is smoother for severe disabilities. The second and fourth columns show the rate of 
each type of condition after adjusting for differences in children’s gender, language spoken at 
home, rural setting, race/ethnicity, birth weight, and age. Controlling for these factors does not 
substantively change the relationship between income and disability status. The findings in 
Figure 3 support general research conclusions about correlations between health outcomes and 
socioeconomic status. 
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The association between disability and income exists for behavioral and mental 
conditions but not for physical conditions. Appendix Table A.4 reorganizes the severe/non-
severe delineation based on whether a disability is behavioral/mental or physical. The 
estimates show a strong relationship between income and the former, but a small and weak 
relationship between income and the latter. The findings suggest that the probability of a 
behavioral disability is 10 percent lower for a child at 200 percent of the poverty line than it is 
for a child at the poverty line, adjusting for other factors. 
Findings for Children in Special Education Programs  
Recent CDE data on actual special education enrollment among children with severe 
disabilities suggests a similar negative relationship with income. The analysis in Appendix 
Table A.5 constructs rates of severe and non-severe disabilities for each SELPA for 2006–07. It 
then uses a regression to adjust the rates for a similar set of characteristics as in Figure 3.18
 The income measure is the percentage of students in a SELPA enrolled in the free or 
reduced-price meals program. Unlike the CHIS analysis, which compares family income and 
disability conditions at the individual level, the analysis using CDE data compares a SELPA’s 
disability rate to its percentage of students in free or reduced-price meals. In other words, it 
only reports associations between aggregated data. While this is an important difference, the 
SELPA is also the level to which AB 602’s assumption of even disability rates applies. 
  
Holding constant other observable characteristics, a lower rate of free or reduced-price 
meals (i.e. higher income) is related to a lower severe disability rate. The findings suggest that 
the severe disability rate is 12 percent higher in a SELPA with 60 percent of students in free or 
reduced-price meals than it is in a SELPA where 30 percent of students are in free or reduced-
price meals. The average rate of free or reduced-price meals across SELPAs is about 46 
percent.19
The relationship between free or reduced-price meals and rates of non-severe disabilities 
is much weaker. Part of the explanation is that grouping disabilities under severe and non-
severe headings masks differences with respect to income at the category of disability level. To 
illustrate this, the remaining columns in Table A.5 show the estimated relationship between free 
or reduced-price meals and the percentage of children classified in each of the six largest 
categories of disability.
 
20
Similar opposing relationships exist for severe disabilities too. Mental retardation is 
more common in lower-income areas while autism is more common in higher-income areas. 
 These categories account for over 90 percent of disabilities in 
California. The data suggest that there are opposing relationships in some cases. Specifically, 
learning disabilities are more common in lower-income areas while other health impairments 
(e.g. ADD and ADHD) are more common in higher-income areas. These opposing relationships 
contribute to a weak association between income and non-severe disabilities overall. 
                                                     
18 The model includes the following characteristics: percent free or reduced-price meals, an index of regional non-teacher wage 
levels, percent English learners, town or rural location, race/ethnicity, SELPA enrollment, AB 602 base rate per ADA, the average 
SELPA revenue limit per pupil, a single-district SELPA indicator, and a constant.  
19 Table A.1 provides summary statistics and Table A.5 contains the regression results. 
20 The categories are learning disabilities, speech or language impairments, other health impairments, mental retardation, autism, 
and emotional disturbance. Lipscomb (2009b) provides disability definitions. 
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Overall, however, rates of severe disabilities tend to be higher in SELPAs with higher 
proportions of low-income students. 
The findings also suggest several significant relationships with severe disabilities 
besides that with income. Holding constant other factors, the rate of severe disabilities is lower 
in SELPAs with higher concentrations of Hispanic and Asian students, lower concentrations of 
African-American students, towns and rural areas, larger SELPAs, and single-district SELPAs. 
Hispanic and Asian children have lower rates of special education classification in California 
while African-Americans have higher rates relative to non-Hispanic white children (Lipscomb, 
2009b). Differences in classification rates by race and ethnicity are most pronounced in the 
categories of emotional disturbance, learning disability, and other health impairment. 
The finding about small towns and rural areas suggests that urban settings may offer a 
wider range of local care options: the greater availability of therapy and medical services overall 
may attract families with severely disabled children. The fact that that severe disability rates are 
also higher in larger and single-district SELPAs appears to support this theory. Single-district 
SELPAs tend to have both above-average district enrollments and to be located in urban 
locations. The AIR study by Parrish et al (1998) found that single-district SELPAs spend more 
per student than do others.  
In sum, both the CHIS and actual special education enrollment data suggest a 
relationship between income and disability status, particularly for severe disabilities. A factor 
related to income, such as free or reduced-price meal eligibility, may be an appropriate proxy to 
identify SELPAs that face a higher rate of severe special education needs. An income-based 
adjustment would have both potential advantages and disadvantages in relation to the existing 
cost proxy, the SDA. The advantages are that it is entirely out of SELPA control, that it could be 
updated regularly, and that it would align closely with the federal formula.  
But an income-based adjustment has potential disadvantages too. A 2004 follow-up 
report by AIR recommended that California instead update the SDA, partly because of the 
differing patterns of mental retardation and autism with respect to poverty. AIR also cited the 
possible social stigma attached to enrolling in free or reduced-price meals at the high school 
level. California could address this issue by collecting data on income, rather than enrollment, 
to determine meal program eligibility. Further, relationships between poverty and disability 
rates do not inform the question of how much additional funding SELPAs need because of 
their higher poverty rate. When the federal government experienced this issue, it adopted an 
85/15 compromise between the population and poverty-based portions of its allocation 
formula. Because of the valid concerns about an income-based adjustment, maintaining the 
existing cost proxy, the SDA, would be a sensible way to go, too. In this case, California 
should update the multipliers that determine funding to maximize the SDA’s effectiveness  
as a proxy for costs today. 
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Spending on Children with Disabilities in California  
Both the prevalence of disabilities and the amount of special education funds affect 
school spending on disabled children. The link to funding comes from IDEA, which requires 
that districts use federal assistance for disabled children to help pay the “excess costs” of 
educating them (Federal Register, 2006).21
Conceptual Framework  
 School districts incur excess costs when they spend 
more educating disabled children than they spend on average on all children. This chapter 
documents spending levels and patterns across SELPAs. As in the previous chapter, the 
emphasis is partly on identifying a factor outside of SELPA control that arguably serves as a 
proxy for cost variation. The focus here is to account for differences in regional labor market 
conditions for educators, a different type of cost from the severity of student needs. 
Despite the name, excess cost is actually a measure of spending. Costs are defined as the 
minimum expenditure for the services a student needs. Expenditures exceed costs when needs 
are not identified correctly or when districts are not providing services efficiently. Patterns of 
spending may resemble, but are not necessarily the same as, patterns of cost. To underscore the 
distinction, this report refers to excess costs as additional spending on children with disabilities. 
Special education and regular education share spending on children with disabilities. 
For example, children with speech impairments may receive speech therapy instruction on a 
regular basis but are otherwise in the regular classroom, while children with severe mental 
retardation may spend most of the school day outside the regular classroom. Figure 4 illustrates 
how this sharing works. The dashed line represents average spending on all children. 
Additional spending on children with disabilities is above the dashed line. Special education 
funds help to defray these amounts, and local funds pay the rest.  
Figure 4 
Illustrating School Spending on Nondisabled and Disabled Children 
 
NOTE: Figure 4 is strictly illustrative, including the dollars per student shown on the vertical axis.  
                                                     
21 This requirement is also listed in California Education Code Section 56841(a). 
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In California, state aid for special education effectively shares the same purpose federal 
funds do in helping defray additional spending on children with disabilities. The effective 
intent of state aid is the same because CDE deducts federal and local special education funds 
from state aid when calculating SELPA allocations. The only way for California to show that 
districts are using IDEA funds as intended is to treat state allocations in the same manner.  
That said, the language in California’s education code suggests a slightly different 
purpose. The cited purpose is to help local districts “provide special education and related 
services to individuals with exceptional needs.”22
The language of the education code contributes to confusion about the term 
“encroachment,” which refers just to the local support amount above the dashed line. 
“Encroachment” conventionally describes any situation where local funds close a gap between 
special education spending and funding.
 In other words, state aid is for the entire 
special education area in Figure 4 according to the education code, although it is actually just 
for the part above the dashed line because of the way California deducts funding from non-state 
sources when calculating SELPA allocations.  
23 This usage may be common and appears to derive 
straight from the education code, but it needs to be better defined because special education 
funds are not meant to pay for all program spending. Children with disabilities generate other 
education funds for schools too, which schools can use for special education spending. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, partial local support for special education finance is the norm 
nationwide. Only Wyoming and Hawaii reimburse 100 percent of special education spending 
(Parrish, et al., 2003).24
Districts draw from their other education funds to pay the local support portion shown 
in Figure 4. Although this money relates to a school district’s excess fiscal needs, it is an 
imperfect measure because it describes expenditures and not costs. (It is important to remember 
that patterns of spending are not necessarily the result of differences in cost.) Variations among 
SELPAs in local support could result from other reasons too, such as parents who have greater 
demands for special education services in one SELPA than in another. 
 In California, state special education aid helps pay just the part of 
spending above the dashed line in Figure 4. Clarifying the intent of state special education aid  
is a suggestion for California to consider.  
That said, special education expenditures are likely to stand as a better proxy for costs 
than other types of school spending because legal contracts between parents and schools under 
IDEA delineate the special education services that schools must provide (Harr, et al., 2006). 
School districts also have a clear incentive to operate special education programs efficiently 
because each additional dollar of local support diminishes available funds for other programs. 
Maximizing efficiency brings expenditures and costs in closer alignment.  
School administrators tend to view local support for additional spending on disabled 
children as evidence of insufficient government funding for meeting special education 
                                                     
22 California Education Code Section 56836.04(b) 
23 For instance, the first page returned from a Google search for “special education encroachment California” on December 8, 2008 
was a financial report from the Fullerton School District (2007). The report budgets $15.1 million for special education services, 
including $6.7 million in encroachment costs.    
24 Hawaii reimburses at a 100 percent rate because it operates a single school district for the entire state. 
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mandates. Additional funding is certainly a possible solution. So is looking for further cost-
saving efficiencies and improving the way the state allocates existing funds. Federal stimulus 
money (The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act [ARRA] of 2009) may provide a rare 
opportunity for schools to reduce local spending on children with disabilities, through an 
additional $1.3 billion in one-time IDEA funds to California school districts. Districts may be 
able to use half of any increase in federal assistance to reduce local and state spending.25
Federal stimulus funds may also lead to greater efficiencies over a longer period if 
schools invest them with that potential in mind. For instance, schools could invest in 
professional development strategies aimed at serving children with disabilities in the regular 
classroom as effectively as possible, or in new diagnostic equipment to better identify student 
needs.
  
26
Expenditure Totals for 2006–07 
  
California public schools spent $53.1 billion, or about $8,447 per pupil, educating 
students in 2006–07 (Table 2). More than $9.3 billion went to providing special education and 
related services. This is part of total spending on children with disabilities. The other part is 
non-special education spending on disabled children.27 This latter amount must be estimated 
because the state’s education finance data do not separate regular education spending for 
disabled and nondisabled children.28 We find that the regular education portion was about $2.7 
billion for 2006–07. In other words, total spending on children with disabilities was $12.0 billion, 
or about $17,633 per disabled child in the state.29 The average amount of spending per disabled 
child in California is roughly 19 percent higher than previous estimates for the nation.30
  
 
Lipscomb (2009b) finds a similar difference between California and past national estimates for 
the special education component of spending alone. 
                                                     
25 Ordinarily, school districts must spend more on special education from local or combined state and local funds in a year than in 
the prior year (in total or in per pupil terms) to meet funding “Maintenance of Effort” requirements.  
26 The ARRA example considers an increase in funding for children with disabilities. In theory, an increase in general-purpose 
funding can also reduce local support for additional spending by raising the dashed line in Figure 4.  
27 Non-special education spending is not the same as spending in the regular classroom environment because children can receive 
special education services in the regular classroom. 
28 The method in this report is to prorate non-special education spending based on the percentage of the school day that children 
with the same disability in California spend inside the regular classroom. For instance, each nondisabled student gets one share of 
non-special education spending. Disabled students get a fractional share based on their disability. See Appendix B for full details.  
29 The financial data includes all special education expenditures on behalf of children up to age 22. As a result, average spending per 
disabled child is found by dividing $12.0 billion into total special education enrollment among children up to age 22.  
30 The Center for Special Education Finance (2003) reports $13,054 in average spending per school-aged special education student in 
2001–02. This converts to about $14,819 in 2006 dollars. The inflation adjustment is the Consumer Price Index for the west region of 
the United States. 
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Table 2 
Education Spending per Student by Disability Status, 2006–07 
 
Dollars 
(billions) 
Dollars per 
Total 
Enrollment 
Dollars per 
Disabled 
Child  
Dollars per 
Nondisabled 
Child 
Total Expenditures 53.1 8,447   
Special Education Expenditures 9.3 1,474 13,642  
Non-Special Ed Spending on Children with Disabilities 2.7 431 3,991  
Total Spending on Children with Disabilities 12.0 1,905 17,633  
Total Spending on Children without Disabilities 41.1 6,542  7,334 
NOTE: Appendix B describes the methodology. All amounts are net of capital outlay and debt service 
expenditures. The sample includes data from all school districts, county offices of education, and 
transportation joint powers agencies. Total enrollment is 6,282,036 K–12, ungraded, and adult education 
students. Special education enrollment is 678,699 children with disabilities ages 0–22. 
 
By comparison, California schools spent about $41.1 billion educating nondisabled 
children in 2006–07, about $7,334 per child. Spending on disabled children was 2.4 times higher 
than spending on nondisabled children. The spending ratio in California is somewhat higher 
than spending ratios estimated for the nation. Harr, Parrish, and Chambers (2008) summarize 
the results from four studies analyzing data between 1968–69 and 1999–2000. The spending 
ratios for the nation in these studies range from 1.90 to 2.29.31
California’s higher spending ratio may reflect several factors. For one, the average 
severity level of special education students in California may be higher than in other states. 
California has the nation’s lowest rate of special education identification, well below the 
national average of about 14 percent (Lipscomb, 2009b). A lower rate of classification among 
children with the least severe disabilities may account for much of this difference. If so, the 
population of special education students in California has a bigger share of severely disabled 
children, helping to explain its relatively higher spending ratio. 
  
The interaction between the service entitlement, California’s higher personnel costs, and 
its lower overall rate of spending per student may also contribute to a higher spending ratio. 
Personnel costs represent 80 percent of district expenditures in California (Rose and Sengupta, 
2007). According to the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES), college graduates in California earn higher salaries than in practically every other 
state.32
The share of school spending devoted to children with disabilities resembles what is 
found in other states, but California classifies fewer students that way. Disabled children 
account for 10 percent of enrollment in California but 22.5 percent of spending. Nationwide 
estimates for 1999–2000 found that 12.1 percent of students were disabled, and that 21.4 percent 
 California school districts need to pay these higher salaries to attract quality educators 
and, like other states, they need to meet special education mandates. To the extent that school 
districts in California meet special education mandates at higher costs than other states but 
spend less overall, they have less revenue available to support other programs. 
                                                     
31 It is possible that the national spending ratio has grown since 1999–2000 because of growth in high cost disabilities like autism.  
32 See the Comparable Wage Index data at www.nces.ed.gov. 
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of spending was devoted to them (Harr, et al., 2006). California may spend more, but it does not 
spend the most. The Special Education Expenditure Project (SEEP) analyzed spending in 11 
states between 1999 and 2001. Adjusted for inflation, the findings suggest that five of the states 
exceeded California’s average spending on disabled children in 2006–07.33
Additional Spending on Disabled Children and Local Support 
    
Figure 5 illustrates California’s $12 billion in spending on children with disabilities in 
the same way as Figure 4. The first portion, at the bottom of the column, is for non-special 
education spending. The next part is special education spending below the dashed line that 
represents average spending on all children. Together, these components totaled $4.4 billion in 
2006–07. Additional spending accounts for the remaining $7.6 billion. Special education funding 
offsets about $4.7 billion in additional spending, leaving $2.9 billion in local support. 
Altogether, special education funds offset 62 percent of additional spending on disabled 
children. The local support portion is the remaining 38 percent, or 24 percent of total spending 
on children with disabilities.  
Figure 5 
California School Spending on Children with Disabilities, 2006–07 
 
NOTE: Appendix B describes the method used for each calculation. Data come from the Standardized 
Account Code Structure and IDEA Educational Environment records for 2006.   
 
We measure additional spending and local support at the SELPA level based on each 
SELPA’s entire student population. Spending and funding at the district level has more to do 
with local plan agreements than how the funding formula works. The methodology for 
calculating spending in this report follows federal regulations closely (see Appendix B) except 
for two main differences. First, the federal regulations describe a district-level calculation. 
                                                     
33 SEEP examined spending in Alabama, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
Maryland, and Wyoming (Center for Special Education Finance, 2003). 
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Second, they specify that districts should make separate calculations for elementary and 
secondary students.  
Neither of these differences is likely to change the finding that there is a wide range of 
additional spending and local support per student across California. For instance, Table 3 
shows that local support represented $1,004 of $1,830 in additional spending per student at Mt. 
Diablo Unified School District (USD) SELPA. This is 120 percent and 52 percent higher, 
respectively, than the statewide average of $455 and $1,201 per student. Special education funds 
appear to be more than sufficient to offset all additional spending on children with disabilities 
in a few SELPAs. For example, Sierra County Office of Education (COE) SELPA had about $930 
per student in additional spending but received $1,188 per student in special education grants.  
Table 3 
SELPAs with the 10 Highest and Lowest Levels of Local Support per Student, 2006–07 
SELPAs with the Most Local Support per Student  SELPAs with the Least Local Support per Student 
SELPA Name 
Additional 
Spending 
Special 
Education 
Revenue  
Local 
Support 
 
SELPA Name 
Additional 
Spending 
Special 
Education 
Revenue  
Local 
Support 
Mt. Diablo USD 1,830 826 1,004  Sierra COE 930 1,188 -258 
Los Angeles USD 1,794 851 943  Trinity COE 1,016 1,132 -116 
San Diego CUSD 1,831 900 932  Lassen COE 972 1,040 -68 
Newport-Mesa USD 1,636 728 908  Colusa COE 747 773 -27 
Santa Clara I 1,557 672 885  Santa Clara III 1,020 983 37 
North Orange 1,594 764 830  Siskiyou COE 955 902 53 
Tri-City (Culver City USD) 1,489 780 709  Tehama COE 812 740 71 
Santa Clara II 1,417 710 707  Imperial COE 728 649 79 
North Region (Albany) 1,419 729 691  Humboldt/Del Norte 804 725 79 
San Mateo COE 1,464 779 685  Modoc COE 1,403 1,320 83 
NOTES: See Appendix Table B.2 for the complete list of SELPAs. The statewide per pupil average values 
are $1,201 of additional spending, $746 of special education revenue, and $455 of local support. 
 
SELPA funding clearly differs across California, but not because of differences in 
spending; SELPAs with higher additional spending per student tend to have higher amounts of 
local support per student (Figure 6). The solid line in the figure would be flatter if SELPAs with 
higher additional spending instead tended to receive more special education aid per student. 
Figure 6 describes an empirical relationship in the data, but not necessarily a policy concern 
because census-based models are not supposed to track spending. To the extent that spending 
and costs align closely, however, Figure 6 suggests that adjusting allocations based on cost 
proxies may help equalize the amount of local support per student across the state. 
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Figure 6 
Additional Spending and Local Support for California SELPAs, 2006–07 
 
SOURCE: Author’s calculation based on Appendix Table B.2  
 
Spending and Regional Non-Teacher Wages  
Patterns of spending on children with disabilities relate to regional labor market 
conditions in California. As mentioned earlier, the average salary for college-educated workers 
in California is among the highest across the states, and employee compensation is the 
predominant expenditure for schools. Teacher compensation varies considerably across 
California (Rose and Sengupta, 2007); for 2003–04, for a mid-career teacher, it ranged from less 
than $55,000 in Yolo and the North Coast counties to more than $70,000 in Santa Clara and 
Orange Counties.34
When the price of resources is higher, school districts have less purchasing power under 
a fixed budget, meaning that they need to look for efficiencies in their program offerings. 
Districts have less flexibility in special education offerings because meeting special education 
mandates supersedes budgetary concerns. For example, if a student needs a special education 
aide in the regular classroom, schools must provide one whether they are in Yolo or Santa Clara 
Counties. 
 
Rose and Sengupta (2007) found that the wages of non-teachers with similar educational 
attainment as teachers provide a good benchmark for contextualizing differences in teacher 
compensation across labor markets in California. They developed a comparable wage index 
(CWI) that compares non-teacher wages in a regional labor market to the statewide average. 
Figure 7 shows a positive relationship between non-teacher wages and local support for 
additional spending on disabled children. The value of the index is higher for SELPAs located 
where non-teachers earn higher average wages.  
                                                     
34 These salaries are for teachers with 10 years of experience and 60 credits beyond a bachelor’s degree. 
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Figure 7 
Local Support for Additional Spending and Regional Non-Teacher Wages, 2006–07 
 
NOTE: The statewide average value of the CWI is 1.   
 
The CWI serves as a proxy for variation in the personnel costs of hiring and retaining 
educators because it corresponds to the wage that teachers can expect outside of teaching.35 It is 
helpful in studying patterns of spending because it is outside the control of school districts and 
teachers’ unions. External labor market conditions are a different type of cost for districts than 
the amount and severity of special education needs.36  
Appendix Table B.3 adjusts the relationship in Figure 7 for differences in a number of 
observable SELPA characteristics. These include the percent enrolled in free or reduced-price 
meals, percent English learners, urban or rural location, race-ethnicity, total enrollment, 
measures of special education and general purpose funding, and an indicator for single-district 
SELPAs. The findings indicate that both additional spending and local support per student 
relate positively to the comparable wage index, holding these factors constant.37 The analysis 
supports the same conclusion by further controlling for the rate of both severe and non-severe 
disabilities. Patterns of spending relate to factors beyond types of disability.38 
Figure 8 illustrates the expected rate of spending if the CWI were 10 percent above 
average, adjusting for observable SELPA characteristics and rates of disability. The findings 
suggest that additional spending on disabled children per pupil would be about 4.3 percent 
higher than average. 
  
                                                     
35 See Rose and Sengupta (2007) for illustrations of the relationship between teacher and non-teacher wage levels across counties in 
California. 
36 Comparable plots to Figure 7, available upon request, show little evidence of a relationship between the comparable wage index 
and either the overall rate of special education or the rate of severe disability.  
37 The findings are numerically identical because special education funding per student is held constant.  
38 Several other variables are significant as well. Higher additional spending relates to lower enrollment in free or reduced-price 
meals, a higher concentration of English learners, larger SELPAs, more special education funds per student, single-district SELPAs, 
and higher severe disability rates. The lower rate of additional spending in SELPAs with larger rates of free or reduced-price meals 
appears to reflect a higher rate of spending overall (i.e. a higher dashed line in Figure 4). 
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Figure 8 
Spending in a SELPA with a CWI 10 Percent above Average, 2006–07 
 
NOTE: Asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level. The findings come from columns 
3 through 5 in Appendix Table B.3. Per-pupil spending includes both disabled and nondisabled students 
in the denominator.  
 
For comparison, Figure 8 illustrates similar relationships for the overall rate of spending 
on disabled and nondisabled children. The association between the CWI and spending per 
pupil on disabled children is the larger of the two, holding constant other factors. Spending on 
disabled children is expected to be about 3.7 percent higher than average while spending on the 
nondisabled is expected to be 2.2 percent higher. The association is more precise for disabled 
children as well. In fact, the CWI in Appendix Table B.3 is not statistically significant in 
describing patterns of spending per pupil on nondisabled children.  
In most states, school districts have the option to try raising additional income if 
resources are expensive. In California, however, the state largely sets education revenue and 
leaves few options for local school districts to raise funds. Rose and Sengupta (2007) propose 
using the CWI to help equalize the purchasing power of school district budgets. At least two 
other recent policy reports on California education finance share this recommendation 
(Sonstelie, 2007; Bersin, Kirst, and Liu, 2007). Sonstelie (2007) reaches this conclusion after 
applying a theoretical framework of economic decisionmaking under a fixed budget and a set of 
resource costs to school finance and survey data. Using a theoretical model to guide the analysis 
helps to moderate concerns about using expenditure data to describe patterns arguably related 
to cost. The empirical strategy in this study resembles the one suggested by the theoretical 
model in Sonstelie (2007).  
The Rose and Sengupta (2007) and Sonstelie (2007) studies were written as part of the 
Getting Down to Facts research project on California school finance and governance that was 
organized by Stanford University. The Bersin, Kirst, and Liu (2007) proposal grew out of the 
findings. This latter study proposes a funding system that consists of a base grant per student, 
an equalized special education grant per student, targeted funding for low-income students, 
and a regional cost adjustment. The findings in this section support a similar conclusion about 
the CWI and special education funds. 
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Suggestions for Improving Special Education Finance  
California’s switch to per-student funding via AB 602 (1997) improved the state 
allocation formula by placing a greater emphasis on funding equity, transparency, and 
flexibility while minimizing incentives to classify students inappropriately. But more than a 
decade later, California’s census-based funding system shows signs that still more could be 
done. Children still generate different amounts of special education funding depending on the 
SELPA in which they live. Moreover, the variations in funding rates today reflect the historical 
disparities that existed under the previous funding regime.  
California could take the following two steps toward implementing more fully the type 
of special education finance system it chose to adopt in 1997.  
• Refine the allocation model. Equalize the base rates and adjust funding for a small 
number of factors outside of SELPA control.  
• Clarify the state’s objective for special education funds. Emphasize providing 
appropriate services for educating disabled children rather than providing special 
education services alone. 
Refine the Allocation Model 
California should preserve its census-based approach for special education finance, but 
it can improve upon the existing design. The first step is to complete the equalization of base 
rates per student across the state. The second step is to adjust funding for a small number of 
factors that are outside of SELPA control and could serve as a proxy for true cost variation.  
The resulting model would aim to be sensible and simple, furthering the existing 
funding goals. As a census-based model, schools would be unable to influence funding levels 
based on the way they classify and serve students. Further, it could offer SELPAs greater 
flexibility in using funding, should policymakers decide to consolidate several sources of 
special education revenue into one allocation. According to a recent report by the Legislative 
Analyst’s Office (2008), SELPAs receive state special education funds through 15 separate 
programs. The report argues for merging many of these funds because the current allocation 
method makes it hard to see how much funding the state provides and how it ultimately 
distributes funds. 
This study suggests a possible form for a consolidated formula that involves equal base 
rates, with adjustments for eligibility in free or reduced-price meals, and regional non-teacher 
wage levels. The formula could resemble the federal IDEA funding process, distributing 85 
percent of funds based on enrollment and 15 percent based on poverty. Such a formula would 
also resemble the Bersin, Kirst, and Liu (2008) proposal for California’s K–12 education finance 
system that includes both funding for low-income students and a regional wage adjustment. 
Appendix C provides technical information.   
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Each SELPA’s funding allocation, F, would take the following form: 
 
The formula has two components, a base and a regional wage adjustment. Most of the base (a 
0.85 weight in this example) would come from multiplying the statewide base rate by total 
SELPA enrollment. The rest is an adjustment for low-income students. The adjustment is the 
statewide base rate multiplied by the number of students eligible for free or reduced-price 
meals. The formula then adjusts a SELPA’s base funding for regional wage levels. The average 
value of the regional wage adjustment is one. 
 The statewide base rate depends on how much money California consolidates into the 
allocation. Table 4 compares the simulated allocation to the current allocation using funds from 
the AB 602 base entitlement (second chart in Figure 2). Appendix Table C.1 provides a similar 
analysis using all AB 602 funds (first chart in Figure 2).39
Table 4 
Base Allocation Funds Under Simulated and Current Models, 2006–07 
 The respective statewide base rates are 
$673 or $740 per student. California could apply future cost of living adjustments or other 
funding supplements directly to the base rates. 
A. Statewide Average, Low, and High Values 
    
 
    Average Lowest Highest 
   Simulated Allocation 605 491 692 
   Current Base Allocation 605 547 995 
   
          B. Model Comparison 
             Comparable Wage Index 
   
Simulated Allocation   Current Base Allocation 
   
Low Medium High   Low Medium High 
      .74–.92 .93–.98 .99–1.15   .74–.92 .93–.98 .99–1.15 
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Low 0–38 533 581 620   632 604 625 
Medium 39–56 542 596 647   616 582 594 
High  57–100 560 618 659   652 599 646 
NOTES: Summary statistics are weighted by total SELPA enrollment. The low, medium, and high 
categories in the model comparison each include about one-third of SELPAs. Table C.1 provides a similar 
model comparison using all AB 602 funds. 
 
Section A shows that the simulated allocation maintains the actual level of base funding 
that was available to SELPAs in 2006–07. The difference is in how funding is distributed, with 
                                                     
39 The simulation in Appendix Table C.1 uses all AB 602 funds for simplicity. Policymakers should leave some AB 602 programs, 
such as funding for out-of-home care, unchanged.  
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the simulated allocation reducing funding variation across the state. By design, funding per 
student under the simulated model (see Section B) is highest for SELPAs with large proportions 
of lower-income students in regions with higher expected personnel expenses. Funding per 
student is smallest for SELPAs that have the opposite student and personnel characteristics.40
The simulated allocation in Table 4 is just one possible way for policymakers to refine 
the funding formula and stay consistent with the finance reform goals of 1997. In practice, the 
state legislature could adjust the 85/15 weighting between the enrollment portion and the low-
income adjustment. It could also identify and use other adjustment factors. For instance, 
California could maintain the SDA, the existing AB 602 cost proxy. In this case, the state should 
consider whether updating the SDA’s eligibility criteria after a decade would provide an even 
better cost proxy.  
 
The existing allocation shows less consistent patterns with respect to regional wage levels and 
proportions of low-income students. For instance, SELPAs in the low/low categories currently 
have among the higher average rates of base funding.   
Refining the funding formula along the lines of Table 4 would help California move 
closer to fully implementing its census-based finance reform goals. Recent policy research on 
education finance in California supports this type of model. It could even lead to greater 
efficiencies through increased flexibility. Implementation would require additional state funds 
only if California chose initially to hold SELPAs harmless (i.e., prevent them from losing funds 
under the new formula) and then phase out the hold-harmless provision over several years.  
Clarify the State’s Objective for Special Education Funds 
California can have more constructive special education debates at state and local levels 
by focusing on total spending to educate children with disabilities rather than on special 
education expenditures alone. This broader frame of reference provides a more complete 
picture of how schools use both the regular education and special education environments to 
meet the needs of children with disabilities. By examining total expenditures on disabled 
children in relation to total expenditures on nondisabled children, school districts can more 
meaningfully account for what is spent and why. 
The state can take an important step by aligning the intent of state special education 
funds with IDEA. This would provide a clearer rationale for funding because both state and 
federal funds share the same purpose—helping to defray the additional spending to educate 
children with disabilities. A secondary benefit would be to help clarify the actual meaning of 
the term encroachment (the local share of additional spending on disabled children). Doing so 
would underscore how the debate should focus on whether the size of the local share is fair for 
providing a free and appropriate public education, not on whether the local share should exist 
at all. 
In addition, better data would improve special education discussions and ensure 
greater program accountability. Currently, state data systems are not equipped to calculate 
school spending by a child’s disability status. The missing ingredient is the capacity to 
                                                     
40 The low/low cell includes San Juan, Lassen, Tuolumne, San Luis Obispo, Amador, Calaveras, El Dorado, Nevada, Clovis, Sierra, 
and Placer. The high/high cell includes Garden Grove, West Contra Costa, San Francisco, Santa Ana, Anaheim, and Oakland. 
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account for non-special education spending on children with disabilities. This report is able to 
provide an estimate, but calculations that are more exact would be possible if the current data 
collection could track spending by disability status.41
 California’s current funding formula has several desirable properties, but more can be 
done. By building upon the state’s existing accomplishments in reforming special education finance, 
it can develop a system to serve as a role model for education finance reforms in the future. 
  
                                                     
41 Appendix B describes the methodology used in the report. 
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